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EMBRACING THE COMMODIFICATION OF HUMAN ORGANS: 
TRANSPLANTATION AND THE FREEDOM TO SELL BODY PARTS 
MARK J. CHERRY* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Mr. Jake Linford’s rich exploration in “The Kidney Donor Scholarship 
Act: How College Scholarships Can Provide Financial Incentives for Kidney 
Donation While Preserving Altruistic Meaning” elucidates the moral 
complexities to which organ donation policy gives rise.1  His conclusion that 
providing valuable college scholarships as an incentive would very likely 
increase kidney donation rates is, I believe, correct.  Indeed, elsewhere I 
have argued extensively in favor of developing an open market in human 
organs for transplantation.2  It is worth noting, though, that however much 
Mr. Linford wishes to avoid market terminology, while preserving the 
rhetorical language of “altruism” and “gift-giving”, he is defending a market 
in human kidneys for transplantation—albeit a heavily regulated and 
governmentally restricted barter market.  At times his arguments rely on 
common but questionable assumptions.  The discussion presumes, for 
example, that human kidneys are not properly understood as a commodity.3  
Why?  The discussion also assumes that the debate regards determining 
which policy would be both effective in increasing the availability of organs 
and politically tenable, i.e., which policy will not unduly disturb public 
 
* Mark J. Cherry, Ph.D. is the Dr. Patricia A. Hayes Professor in Applied Ethics, Department of 
Philosophy, St. Edward’s University, 3001 S. Congress Ave., Box 844, Austin, Texas 78704; 
markc@stedwards.edu. 
 1. Jake Linford, The Kidney Donor Scholarship Act: How College Scholarships Can 
Provide Financial Incentives for Kidney Donations While Preserving Altruistic Meaning, 2 ST. 
LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 265 (2009). 
 2. MARK J. CHERRY, KIDNEY FOR SALE BY OWNER: HUMAN ORGANS, TRANSPLANTATION, AND 
THE MARKET, at xiii-xiv (2005). 
 3. See Linford, supra note 1, at 291-92 (discussing the way in which the medical 
community presents the procurement of kidneys as a gift in order to preserve the rhetoric of 
altruism and suppress negative social reaction). 
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sensibilities, while also increasing access to kidneys for transplantation.4  Mr. 
Linford works with the standard assumption that cash payments to donors 
would somehow morally soil the procurement and distribution of organs for 
transplantation.5  Perhaps, however, the jurisprudential question would be 
better focused on a critical and careful exploration regarding the permissible 
limits of governmental authority over the free choices of persons. 
In this reply essay, I briefly raise several challenges to these central 
assumptions.  My goal is to explore the ways in which such assumptions are 
uncritically accepted even as they frame the debate.  I argue that each is 
illegitimate.  First, I argue that human kidneys are as a matter of fact 
commodities.  Honestly recognizing and confronting this circumstance will 
likely lead to greater trust in the transplantation community.  Denying that 
human organs are a commodity, even while treating them as such, 
encourages the continuation of dishonest public policy, tending towards vice 
rather than virtue.  Second, I argue that individuals possess authority over 
themselves and their own bodies, and thus the burden of proof legitimately 
to forbid persons from selling a redundant internal organ, such as a kidney, 
is significant and not easily met.  Third, as a result, even if financial 
incentives (such as college scholarships) resulted in fewer kidneys available 
for transplantation, such a consequence would not meet the burden of proof 
necessary to forbid individuals from selling their redundant or renewable 
internal organs.  In sum, instead of rhetorically pretending that offering 
valuable incentives (such as college scholarships) to donors does not 
commodify human organs, we should honestly embrace a market in human 
organs for transplantation, including direct financial payments and other 
valuable offers, to compensate persons for parting with their redundant or 
renewable internal organs while living, or to compensate families for the 
organs of their recently deceased loved one. 
II.  HUMAN KIDNEYS AS COMMODITIES – EMBRACING REALITY 
Offering financial and other valuable incentives for organ donation is 
usually denounced as inappropriately treating the human body and its parts 
as commodities.  Many argue that offering financial, or other valuable 
compensation, to living donors exemplifies immoral and improper 
commodification of the human body.6  The underlying moral intuition is that 
 
 4. See id. at 295-96 (arguing that scholarship incentives preserve the rhetoric of altruism 
while protecting individuals from coercion and exploitation to a higher degree than is possible 
with a system of outright commodification). 
 5. See id. at 311 (claiming that a raw cash-for-kidneys system could lead to 
unreasonable coercive pressure). 
 6. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 156 (1996) (arguing that 
objectification, a pejorative when applied to persons, occurs through commodification when 
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while some goods (e.g., cars) are appropriately procured and distributed 
through the market, others (e.g., human kidneys) are not.7  Insofar as 
valuable incentives for donating organs for transplantation would improperly 
commodify human body parts, it is argued that such incentives should 
continue to be prohibited.8 
Mr. Linford urges, for example, that one of the advantages of utilizing 
college scholarships as an incentive is that “[b]ecause scholarships are 
understood as manifestations of altruism, the scholarship incentive can be 
designed to preserve spaces where altruistic giving will be both desirable 
and essential.”9  Moreover, Mr. Linford later states: 
[p]roviding financial incentives in the form of a scholarship occupies a 
different rhetorical space than that of a raw financial incentive.  An incentive 
program that naturally leads to a discussion of financial incentives in terms 
of gift language preserves the rhetoric of altruism and protects space for 
altruistic meaning.10 
In contrast, “commodification” is presented as a moral invective: “[o]ften, 
however, those who donate organs or gametes do not realize that they are 
contributing to a system rife with commodification”.11  The hope is that the 
rhetorical effect of “college scholarships” preserves the underlying moral 
intuition that it is somehow wrong to treat human organs as a commodity, 
thereby continuing to frame organ donation within the moral discourse of 
“altruism,” while still providing a valuable incentive to increase the living 
kidney donor pool. 
Here, an initial conceptual concern is to distinguish those characteristics 
that mark off a commodity from other types of goods.  Commodities are 
signified by 1) objectification (“ascription of status as a thing in the Kantian 
sense of something that is manipulable at the will of persons”); 2) fungibility 
(“fully interchangeable with no effect on value to the holder”); 3) 
commensurability (“values of things can be arrayed as a function of one 
 
cultural rhetoric views certain human attributes as commodities that can be bought and sold in 
markets). 
 7. See, e.g., Alan Wertheimer, Two Questions About Surrogacy and Exploitation, 21 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 211, 218 (1992) (arguing that while some goods, such as automobiles and 
books, may be properly traded for money, other goods, such as human beings, should not be 
exchanged for money). 
 8. See generally RADIN, supra note 6, at 163 (arguing that commodification, 
objectification, and subordination are intertwined, which results in the failure to respect human 
beings and personhood). 
 9. Linford, supra note 268, at 4. 
 10. Id. at 303 (emphasis added). 
 11. Id. at 293 n.126. 
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continuous variable”); and 4) money equivalence (“the continuous variable 
in terms of which things can be ranked is dollar value”).12 
A challenge for those who oppose treating human organs as a 
commodity is that organs are in fact manipulable and interchangeable with 
others of the same kind.  This is the very reason that transplantation is 
medically viable.  When a kidney is removed from Anna and surgically 
implanted in Alexei, it ceases to be a living part of the donor and becomes 
a living part of the recipient.  All systems of transplantation objectify human 
organs and treat them as fungible—organ transplantation as a surgical 
practice requires that we view these decidedly useful body parts as 
exchangeable objects. 
Incommensurability represents a concern that the values at stake cannot 
be relevantly summed and compared.  Here the disquiet is that offering 
financial and other valuable compensation to organ donors would involve 
an exchange of incommensurable values.  By itself, though, 
incommensurability will not establish that straight-forward financial 
compensation is morally inappropriate.  Whereas one may raise the 
concern that financial compensation will fail appropriately to weigh and 
compare economic versus non-economic values, non-market-based 
strategies for procurement and allocation face similar difficulties, as do 
scholarship-based strategies.  Markets, however, do not require that the 
goods exchanged be precisely commensurable.  Such a requirement would 
rule out nearly all transactions.  Rather, permissibility requires that the 
parties transact voluntarily, that deception or other forms of coercion are not 
employed, and that each agree to the value being received.  This means 
that what is received in return is worth at least as much to the party as that 
which was given.  As others have noted, one can buy or sell “priceless” 
works of art without claiming that its aesthetic or historic value is 
commensurate with the money that is paid.13  For example, on June 24, 
2008, a “priceless” Monet water lily painting was sold at auction for forty-
one million pounds at Christie’s in London.14 
Other commentators have urged a related challenge to the 
commensurability of organ donation and financial payments.  Here, the 
claim is that it is morally inappropriate 
when one party to a transaction is oriented toward the exchange of “gift” 
values, while the other party operates in accordance with the norms of the 
market exchange of commodities.  Gift values, which include love, 
 
 12. RADIN, supra note 6, at 118. 
 13. WERTHEIMER, supra note 7, at 218. 
 14. Mike Collett-White, Monet Painting Smashes Auction Record, REUTERS UK, at 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/UKNews1/idUKL2469637120080625 (last visited Mar. 15, 
2009). 
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gratitude, and appreciation of others, cannot be bought or obtained 
through piecemeal calculations of individual advantage.15 
Giving kidneys a monetary expression through financial compensation, one 
might believe, is an inappropriate way to value human body parts.  The 
concern is that through property discourse and financial incentives, 
individuals are encouraged to value those goods regarded as property 
solely in economic terms. 
On the one hand, if the criticism is reasonable, it is not clear how the 
proposed scholarship program avoids this difficulty—college scholarships 
are all too obviously financially valuable.16  Whoever would otherwise be 
paying for the college education (parent, relative, or student) is keenly 
aware of the cash value of the college scholarship.  On the other hand, this 
criticism appears to be greatly over simplified.  Gift values, love, and charity 
can in various ways be brought into the market.  For example, one party to 
a transaction may deliberately sell goods for less than the market value as a 
subtle gift, provide a frequent patron a free drink at the bar, or discount the 
cost of a medical office visit or legal consultation.  Indeed, the criticism is 
relevant if and only if such a dichotomy of intentions exists.  Persons who 
negotiate regarding the fair market value of one’s kidney will not likely 
experience such conceptual dissonance,17 and those who wish simply to 
donate their organs as free gifts may continue to do so.  Such observations 
strongly suggest, however, that there is no reason to limit market incentives 
to college scholarships. 
Other critics raise the concern that such “raw financial incentives” will 
put a price on all organs, and those who do not sell their organs will 
become hoarders of something that is useful to other people and that is 
 
 15. Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women’s Labor a Commodity?, 19 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 71, 84 
(1990). 
 16. The Undergraduate Admission website for Saint Louis University touts that “[m]ore 
than $30.8 million in financial aid was awarded to first-time freshmen in 2007-2008.  Of this 
total, $19.2 million was awarded in the form of scholarship or grant assistance.”  Saint Louis 
University, Undergraduate Admission, Scholarships and Financial Aid, at www.slu.edu/ 
x5203.xml (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).  Such advertisement is designed to encourage 
students to apply to Saint Louis University regardless of their ability to afford the tuition, 
thereby giving the university a larger pool of candidates among whom to choose to offer 
admission. 
 17. For example, consider the case of Dr. Richard Batista, a vascular surgeon who is 
asking for one and a half million dollars in compensation for the organ he donated to his wife 
as part of their divorce settlement.  Charlotte Cardingham, Doctor Demands £1 Million for 
Donated Kidney in Divorce Settlement, MONEY.CO.UK, at www.money.co.uk/article/1002483-
doctor-demands-1-million-pounds-for-donated-kidney-in-divorce-settlement.htm (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2009).  Dr. Batista’s attorney, Dominick Barbara, stated that “[i]n theory we actually 
asked for the return of the kidney.  Of course he wouldn’t really ask for that but the value of 
it.”  Id. 
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financially valuable.18  The moral stumbling block is that such 
considerations hold equally against systems of donation.  As organ donation 
became perceived as the standard of care, organs were recast as mere 
things—as scarce medical resources.19  Persons who are unwilling to donate 
their organs, either while living or after death, are perceived as immorally 
withholding life-sustaining medical resources.  It is this reconceptualization 
of persons as sources of scarce medical resources that has in large measure 
driven the ever increasing proposals for “required request laws”,20 as well as 
for coercive “presumed consent,”21 “expected donation,” or “routine 
salvage” systems of organ procurement.22  This moral challenge similarly 
underlies systems of so-called rewarded gift-giving, such as scholarship 
programs: students (or their parents or other relatives) who do not donate 
will be seen as having failed fully to explore the available options for 
financing higher education in that they possess significantly valuable 
property, e.g., a kidney, which can be traded for a college scholarship.  
How soon will it be until this question is added to college financial aid 
application forms? 
When the Institute of Medicine committee on increasing access to organ 
transplantation issued its 2006 report, Organ Donation: Opportunities for 
Action, their recommendations argued that the goal of the transplantation 
community should be the aggressive ideologically driven re-education of 
social mores to appreciate organ donation as a “social responsibility”;23 
that is, to understand organ donation as a taken-for-granted moral duty. 
. . . [T]he goal should be to move towards a society where people see organ 
donation as a social responsibility.  In such a society, donating organs 
 
 18. See generally Gabriel M. Danovitch & Francis L. Delmonico, The Prohibition of 
Kidney Sales and Organ Markets Should Remain, 13 CURRENT OPINION IN ORGAN 
TRANSPLANTATION 386, 387 (2008) (arguing that the concept of organ sales would target 
vulnerable and poor populations by luring them with the opportunity of selling their valuable 
body parts). 
 19. See generally KAZUO ISHIGURO, NEVER LET ME GO (2005) (telling a fanciful story in 
which an entire class of persons is created to provide donor organs and humans are used as a 
source of spare parts). 
 20. Peter A. Clark, To Be or not to Be a Donor: A Person’s Right of Informed Consent, 8 
CURRENT OPINION IN ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 334, 336 (2003) (stating that “[t]hese laws 
directed hospitals to develop policies to assure that families of all donor-eligible patients 
would be given the opportunity to donate.”). 
 21. Id. (discussing “‘presumed consent’” systems which allow doctors to proceed with 
donations unless the person has expressly stated that they do not wish to donate). 
 22. Adam J. Kolber, A Matter of Priority: Transplanting Organs Preferentially to Registered 
Donors, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 671, 691-96 (2003) Kolber describes “routine salvage” as a 
system that “would seek to transplant every medically eligible organ and would thereby 
maximize lives saved from organ donation.”  Id. at 695. 
 23. Inst. of Med., Organ Donation: Opportunities for Action – Short Report 3 (2006). 
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would be accepted as a normal part of dying, and in cases where a person 
died without recording a specific choice about donating his or her organs, 
the surviving family members would be comfortable giving permission.24 
Concerns to avoid recasting persons as collections of spare parts or as 
hoarders of scarce medical resources is not a challenge particular to 
financial transactions, and thus is not a legitimate objection to offering 
financial compensation to increase living organ donation.  This moral 
concern must be addressed under any system of organ procurement and 
allocation. 
Mr. Linford is aware that the insistent reference to organ donation as an 
altruistic gift is more rhetoric than reality: “. . . viewing kidney procurement 
through an exclusively donative lens is also a terminological subterfuge, 
recognized even by those who are opposed to market-based solutions.  
Organ donation as gift is entirely illusory rhetoric, insomuch as it applies to 
actors in the system other than the donor herself.”25  Moreover, Mr. Linford 
later states: 
Recipients of kidneys either pay out of pocket or turn to private or public 
insurance to purchase kidneys from the procurement agencies, which 
generate income by arranging transplants.  Doctors who perform transplants 
are never asked to donate their services because of a concern that to do 
otherwise would corrupt the process.  Only the donor is treated as 
potentially subject to corruption via commodification.26 
Donors, surgeons, organ procurement agencies, and recipients alike 
objectify organs, treat them as fungible objects, and charge money for 
access to organs.  All systems of organ procurement and allocation treat 
organs as commodities, even donation. 
Well meaning protests to the contrary will not change the reality.  An 
editorial in The Lancet, for example, asserted: 
Ethical arguments have been made for and against the practice, with the 
pro side generally contending that legitimising a market for organs would 
increase their availability.  But human livers and kidneys are not 
commodities, and hospitals are not just another convenient locale for 
money to change hands.  Trade in human organs is immoral and ought to 
be outlawed around the world.27 
The author of the editorial leaves it conveniently unstated that surgeons, 
nurses, hospital administrators, and staff charge significant amounts of 
money for access to medical goods and services—that is, a great deal of 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Linford, supra note 1, at 292. 
 26. Id. at 292-93. 
 27. Editorial, Not for Sale at Any Price, 367 LANCET 1118 (2006). 
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money changes hands in hospitals.  Legislated “altruism” or “gift-giving” 
requires self-sacrifice in an otherwise commercial setting, where surgeons, 
nurses, pharmaceutical companies, hospitals, and staff profit. 
On-going discussions regarding the permissibility of financial 
compensation, or other valuable incentives (such as college scholarships), 
for living organ donation do not really concern whether human organs 
should be commodified, but rather who should receive the valuable health 
care resource and who should bear the costs of appropriation and transfer.  
Each type of organ procurement and allocation system specifies carefully 
stipulated conditions regarding which party will bear the costs and benefits 
of procurement, distribution, and transplantation.  Insofar as donors are 
legally prohibited from accepting financial compensation, organs are a 
highly constrained commodity, where donors are required to part with their 
property without material compensation, while others (including physicians, 
hospitals, procurement agencies and so forth) benefit financially, and the 
recipient of the transplant benefits physically as well as financially, in terms 
of quality and quantity of life, being able to return to work, reduced medical 
bills, and so forth. 
Castigating “raw financial incentives” for kidney donation in favor of the 
supposedly more rhetorically palatable college scholarships, because 
scholarship incentives allegedly preserve altruism, even though altruism in 
this context has already been denounced as “terminological subterfuge” and 
“entirely illusory rhetoric,”28 strikes this commentator as side-stepping reality 
in favor of deceptive marketing.  It is a policy specifically designed to seduce 
healthy members of the public into parting with their very valuable property 
altruistically, within what is otherwise a commercial transaction, thereby 
further muddying the waters of what ought to be a transparent and honest 
process. 
To be clear, I am not raising an objection in principle to permitting 
individuals to purchase a college education through kidney donation.  Many 
students may welcome such a valuable offer.  Perhaps federal and state 
governments could even be convinced to treat the purchase as a non-
taxable transfer of resources.  However, it would be more honest openly to 
acknowledge the commercial circumstances of organ transplantation.  As 
Mr. Linford points out, the public has discovered the commercialization of 
human bodies regardless.29  Moreover, financially compensating donors 
would also be significantly more fair than the current prohibition on such 
payments.  That human organs can only be transferred at a price of zero 
does not thereby reduce the value of such organs to zero.  It 
 
 28. See Linford, supra note 1, at 292. 
 29. Id. at 294 (noting that sperm and egg donors sell the products of their body for a 
financial incentive). 
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straightforwardly transfers the value of the organ from the donor to other 
parties.  College scholarships are one type of compensation, but many 
donors and potential donors may welcome the opportunity to improve their 
financial status even if they do not desire to go to college, or to support 
another through college.  Failing to acknowledge that human organs are a 
valuable commodity, even while public policy and the transplantation 
community treats them as such, encourages the continuation of a dishonest 
social political fiction in what is otherwise a very financially valuable 
commercial transaction.  Honestly recognizing and confronting this 
circumstance will likely lead to the public’s placing of greater trust in the 
transplantation community. 
III.  BARTER MARKETS AND THE CROWDING OUT EFFECT 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “barter” as “the act of trafficking 
by exchange of commodities.”30  In its exchange of valuable commodities—
e.g., a kidney for a college scholarship—the proposed college scholarship 
program is a barter market for procuring kidneys for transplantation.  
Granted, it would be a heavily regulated and governmentally restricted 
market, bartering with goods rather than cash money, but it would be a 
market nonetheless.  While I believe that coercively limiting incentives for 
kidney donation to college scholarships is unduly authoritarian, integrating 
barter markets as one market-based strategy among others would open up 
interesting possibilities for accessing organs for transplantation.  Consider 
organ trading in which families in need of a transplant trade with each other 
for the necessary healthy organs.  For example, a lobe of healthy liver could 
be exchanged for a healthy kidney, or couples could engage in paired 
donor kidney exchanges.31  At Johns Hopkins University Hospital, for 
example, in July of 2003, surgeons performed a “‘triple swap’ kidney 
transplant operation” in which three patients, who were not tissue 
compatible with their own willing donors, exchanged their donor’s kidney for 
 
 30. Barter, Oxford English Dictionary Online, at www.oed.com (last visited May 14, 
2009) 
 31. See Francis L. Delmonico et al., Donor Kidney Exchanges, 4 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 
1628, 1628, 1630 (2004) (finding that as of 2003, four live donor paired exchanges and 
seventeen list exchange kidney transplants had been performed under the United Network for 
Organ Sharing (UNOS) system of kidney transplantation); Susan L. Saidman et al., Increasing 
the Opportunity of Live Kidney Donation by Matching for Two- and Three-Way Exchanges, 81 
TRANSPLANTATION 773, 779 (2006) (discussing that when incompatible donor/recipient pairs 
are entered into a computerized database, compatible pairs are identified who could enter 
into exchanges that would not otherwise occur). 
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a kidney from another of the three donors.32  Each donor provided a kidney 
to one of the three transplant patients.33  Similar organ swaps have 
followed.34 
The success of paired kidney exchanges and other types of organ 
exchanges led eventually to the revision of the 1984 Organ Procurement 
and Transplantation Act.35  The original text prohibited the sale, for 
“valuable consideration” of human organs for use in transplantation, 
punishing violators with a fine of not more than $50,000 or imprisonment 
of not more than five years, or both.36  The law prohibited any for-profit 
commercial harvesting, financial incentives, or other valuable consideration, 
to encourage donation or sale of human organs for transplantation.37  
Valuable consideration was originally defined as excluding “the reasonable 
payments associated with the removal, transportation, implantation, 
processing, preservation, quality control, and storage of a human organ or 
the expenses of travel, housing, and lost wages incurred by the donor.”38  In 
2007, Public Law 110-144 amended the Organ Procurement and 
Transplantation Act to specify that paired kidney exchanges, and certain 
other types of organ exchanges for transplantation, do not violate the 
prohibition on receiving valuable consideration.39  Such amendment was 
necessary because receiving an organ in exchange for an organ, and 
thereby saving the life of a loved one, is quite obviously the receipt of 
valuable consideration; it is a “trafficking by exchange of commodities”40—
the exchange of kidneys for transplantation. 
Mr. Linford raises the concern that financially compensating living organ 
donors will curtail altruistic donation or otherwise intimidate charitably 
inclined donors.41  Critics often argue that the existence of financial 
 
 32. Press Release, Karen Blum, Johns Hopkins Medicine, Johns Hopkins Surgeons 
Perform World’s First ‘Triple Swap’ Kidney Transplant Operation (Aug. 1, 2003), at 
www.hopkinsmedicine.org/press/2003/august/030801.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2009). 
 33. Id. 
 34. See, e.g., Press Release, Trent Stockton, Johns Hopkins Medicine, “Triple Swap” 
Kidney Transplant Operation a Success (Mar. 4, 2004), at www.hopkinsmedicine.org/Press_ 
releases/2004/03_04a_04.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2009) (explaining how a triple swap 
kidney transplant was performed with a new technique called plasmapheresis). 
 35. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (1984); Amendments to the National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. 
L. No. 110-144, 121 Stat. 1813 (2007). 
 36. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a)-(b) (1984). 
 37. See id. § 274e(a) (1984). 
 38. Id. § 274e(c)(2) (1984). 
 39. Amendments to the National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 110-144, 121 Stat. 
1813 (2007). 
 40. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 41. See Linford, supra note 1, at 267-68 (noting that altruism purists believe that altruistic 
giving will decrease in a market system and fewer kidneys will be procured for donation). 
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incentives for organ procurement undermines the freedom charitably to 
donate one’s organs.42  The empirical claim is that if financial incentives are 
routinely offered, while only some will exercise the liberty to sell, such 
incentives may result in an adverse social reaction with fewer individuals 
willing to donate organs.43  This is often referred to as the “crowding out” 
effect.  The Institute of Medicine committee, for example, concluded that 
permitting financial incentives would “crowd-out” altruistic donation: 
[t]he committee examined financial incentives within the gift model of 
donation to determine if they would provide additional increases in the rates 
of organ donation.  Hard data on the impact of incentives are lacking, and 
it may be difficult to obtain reliable data to address these issues.  A pilot 
study of financial incentives for organ donation may set in motion a societal 
process that is difficult to reverse even after the pilot study itself is 
abandoned.  For example, if people begin to view their organs as valuable 
commodities that should be purchased, then altruistic donation may be 
difficult to reinvigorate.44 
This criticism ignores the current circumstance, however, that prohibition of 
financial compensation straightforwardly precludes the freedom of all 
persons to sell their organs.  Given that with a general prohibition on organ 
selling only some will exercise the freedom to donate, the freedom of all to 
sell, if they so desire, is absolutely restricted.  Prohibition of compensation 
for living organ donation necessarily “crowds out” all commercial based 
incentives for increasing access to transplantation. 
Even with a system of financial incentives for organ donation in place, 
private individuals could still donate organs out of charity, refusing all 
compensation, to family members, close friends, or strangers in need of 
transplant.  For-profit markets in food and medicine exist side-by-side with 
food banks, charity hospitals, and other not-for-profit programs.  Presuming 
that the willingness to donate body parts is motivated by actual, rather than 
coerced altruism, those who are willing to donate should still be willing to 
donate regardless of the possibility of compensation.  Most organ donations 
from living persons are to family members or close friends.  The motivations 
underlying such donations are likely to maintain the same force regardless 
of the existence of a market: love, beneficence, loyalty, gratitude, guilt, or 
avoidance of the shame of failing to donate.  For these donors, their 
willingness to donate stems from their relationship with the particular 
patient.  Such donations are unlikely to change either in general character 
 
 42. See id. (noting that some critics assert that the commodification of kidneys could 
adversely coerce participation of underprivileged individuals). 
 43. See id. (discussing that altruism purists hold that there will be a net loss in kidney 
procurement if a market system is instituted). 
 44. INST. OF MED., ORGAN DONATION: OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION AT 11 (2006). 
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(e.g., from altruistic to compensated) or in relative number (e.g., become 
other than driven by the need of a particular friend or relative). 
Financial incentives encourage persons to raise resources to further 
personal as well as social interests and goals.  With financial incentives for 
organ donation, organ procurement need not be artificially limited to acts of 
altruism.  As Mr. Linford notes in his discussion of attitudinal studies, 
financial incentives increase the likelihood of organ donation: “[t]wo Gallup 
polls, the first taken in 1993 and the second in 2005, indicate an increasing 
willingness on the part of survey respondents to consent to donate their 
organs or the organs of a deceased family member if offered a financial 
incentive.”45  Financial incentives would likely lead to an increase in the 
number of living persons willing to donate internal redundant or renewable 
organs to recipients, who are neither family members nor close friends.  
Incentives would also likely lead to the willingness of more families to have 
the organs of their loved ones harvested upon death.  Such public policy 
would thereby incur significant health benefits for all those in need of organ 
transplantation. 
Inevitably the “crowding out” criticism treats the pool of available 
organs as a zero sum game, with any loss of a donated organ characterized 
as an overall loss on the number of organs available.  As Mr. Linford notes: 
[t]he 2005 Gallup poll also noted a polarization, with more respondents 
indicating that financial incentives would make them less likely to donate 
increasing over time (8.9% reporting less likelihood of donation of their own 
or a family member’s organs in 2005 vs. 5% reporting they were less likely 
to donate their own organs and 8% indicating they were less likely to donate 
a family member’s organs).46 
As with all attitudinal studies, the meaningfulness of the data depends on 
which questions were asked, of whom, in what order, and given what sort of 
emphasis.  Respondents may have forgotten, for example, that the existence 
of financial incentives does not preclude donors from acting altruistically, 
refusing all compensation.  That highly valuable works of art (e.g., the 
aforementioned Monet painting) can be sold on the auction block does not 
prevent patrons from giving such works to museums free of charge.  
Regardless, insofar as offers of valuable compensation encourage a 
sufficiently large number of individuals to donate an organ while living, or to 
make their organs available upon death, such incentives would more than 
make up for any losses in strictly altruistic donation. 
 
 45. Linford, supra note 1, at 274-75. 
 46. Id. 
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IV.  PERSONS AND THEIR BODIES 
Even if the market resulted in a net loss in the number of kidneys 
available for transplant—an unlikely consequence—it is unclear what 
grounds legitimately exist to forbid the consensual sale of human organs for 
transplantation.  Here, debate usually focuses either on efficiently increasing 
the number of procured organs or on paternalistically protecting potential 
donors (often couched in lofty terms, such as “preserv[ing] the nobility of 
organ donation”47), and thereby routinely fails to note the moral significance 
of persons and the authority that an individual has over his own body.48  A 
person’s authority over himself, the freedom of choice over his own body 
and mind, is part-and-parcel of maintaining personal integrity.  It is core to 
the respect of persons, which lies at the heart of moral and legal reflections 
on informed consent to medical treatment.49  Here, relevant moral 
considerations can be gathered under three general rubrics: first, the 
authority of persons over themselves, i.e., the authority to be secure against 
unauthorized touching or battery; second, a liberty interest, i.e., an 
acknowledgment of the value of freedom or autonomy; and third, a general 
concern regarding the best interests of the person, combined with a 
recognition that individuals are generally the best judges of their own best 
interests.50  Bringing together longstanding moral and jurisprudential 
considerations that highlight individual autonomy and the authority of 
persons over themselves, such reflections appreciate persons as possessing 
a dignity that should not be violated by unauthorized touching, but who may 
consent to more-or-less risky activities.  It is an acknowledgement of the 
authority of persons over themselves. 
Historically, the common-law has appreciated a right to be secure 
against battery, a right not to be touched, which was grounded in the 
authority of individuals over themselves, rather than in a view of the best 
interests of the person.  The focus was on the individual as in authority to 
 
 47. International Summit on Transplant Tourism and Organ Trafficking, The Declaration 
of Istanbul on Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tourism, 3 CLINICAL J. AM. SOC’Y NEPHROLOGY 
1227, 1227-1231 (2008). 
 48. H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., The Body for Fun, Beneficence, and Profit: A Variation on 
a Post-Modern Theme, in PERSONS AND THEIR BODIES: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, RELATIONSHIPS 
277, 301 (Mark J. Cherry ed., 1999); Eric Mack, The Alienability of Lockean Natural Rights, in 
PERSONS AND THEIR BODIES: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, RELATIONSHIPS 143, 176 (Mark J. Cherry 
ed., 1999). 
 49. See generally Mark J. Cherry, Persons and Their Bodies: Rights, Responsibilities, and 
the Sale of Organs, in PERSONS AND THEIR BODIES: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, RELATIONSHIPS 1, 5-
8 (Mark J. Cherry ed., 1999) (noting that consent to organ donation must be voluntarily given 
in order for it to be morally effective). 
 50. Mark J. Cherry & H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Informed Consent in Texas: Theory and 
Practice, 29 J. MED. & PHIL. 237, 241 (2004). 
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determine what was to be done to himself and his body.  In medicine, this 
jurisprudential tradition found particular voice in the opinion of Justice 
Cardozo in Schloendorff v. The Society of The New York Hospital (1914), 
who argued that 
[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine 
what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an 
operation without his patient’s consent, commits an assault, for which he is 
liable in damages.  This is true except in cases of emergency where the 
patient is unconscious and where it is necessary to operate before consent 
can be obtained.51 
A competent patient has the right to refuse medical treatment, even if the 
surgery or other therapy would benefit the life or health of the patient.  Such 
a right to be left alone has been recognized in a number of key court 
holdings.  For example, in Olmstead v. United States (1928), the Supreme 
Court held that 
[t]he makers of our Constitution . . . sought to protect Americans in their 
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.  They conferred, 
as against the government, the right to be let alone—the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.52 
Neither the general public nor the state need to agree with the person’s 
decision, or even judge his choice reasonable.  In 1964, Warren Burger, at 
that time a D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Judge, commented that 
[n]othing in [his Olmstead holding] suggests that Justice Brandeis thought 
an individual possessed these rights only as to sensible beliefs, valid 
thoughts, reasonable emotions, or well-founded sensations.  I suggest he 
intended to include a great many foolish, unreasonable and even absurd 
ideas which do not conform, such as refusing medical treatment even at 
great risk.53 
Respect for persons and their individual bodily integrity is firmly entrenched 
in much of U.S. law.  As the Supreme Court opined in Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, personal decisions that profoundly 
affect bodily integrity should be largely beyond the reach of government.54 
The weight of this moral and jurisprudential tradition establishes persons 
as in authority over themselves and as the presumed authoritative judge of 
their own best interests.  Persons are in authority to make their own 
judgments regarding acceptable risks and benefits as they collaborate with 
 
 51. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-130 (Ct. App. 1914) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 52. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928). 
 53. In re President and Dirs. of Georgetown Coll., Inc., 331 F.2d 1010, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 
1964). 
 54. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 926-27 (1992). 
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others through freedom of association and contract (e.g., becoming an 
experimental subject in a surgery protocol or choosing to donate a kidney 
while living).  Persons may grant permission to be touched or used in ways 
that absent their permission would be profoundly harmful (e.g., assault vs. 
surgery, rape vs. consensual sex).  While persons may not typically be 
treated medically without permission, they may consent to more-or-less 
risky—even life endangering—activities such as joining the military or the 
police, working on oil rigs, climbing mountains, moving to a more 
dangerous city,55 parachuting out of airplanes, undergoing elective plastic 
surgery, engaging in promiscuous sex, piercing various body parts, having 
oneself tattooed, donating a kidney or liver lobe while living, and so forth, 
setting life and health at risk for national patriotism, career advancement, 
monetary profit, recreational or altruistic interests, personal pleasure, or to 
enhance one’s attractiveness to potential sexual partners.  In each case, 
neither the decisions nor the outcomes are necessarily approved as 
“good”—some may judge the choices as imprudent, or decry the 
consequences as unwelcome.  Rather, there is a prima facie lack of moral 
authority to interfere in the free choices of persons who act with consenting 
others.  Such moral and jurisprudential considerations constitute, for 
example, one of the central justifications for the practice of informed 
consent in medicine.56 
Such judgments recognize as well the difficulty of choosing correctly in a 
secular, morally pluralistic society.  Which choice is morally preferable: 
working at a higher risk job with greater pay or accepting a lower paying, 
less risky job?  Individuals frequently choose risky forms of entertainment 
(e.g., mountain climbing, body tattoos, and multiple sexual partners) and 
risky employment (e.g., joining the Marine Corps or playing professional 
football) to satisfy personal preferences, career goals, or individual 
temperament.  Why would those who choose riskier forms of employment 
be either irrational or immoral?  Absent agreement regarding what God 
demands or moral rationality conclusively demonstrates, individuals act 
within rather broad side constraints as the best judges of their own best 
interests and of their own preferred methods for attempting to realize such 
 
 55. For example, many residents of New Orleans, who were relocated to other cities in 
the wake of hurricane Katrina, are returning to live in New Orleans, even though New 
Orleans is ranked by City Crime Rankings 2008-2009 as having the highest per capita crime 
rate among U.S. cities, including a 199.1% increase in violent crime during the past year. 
Similarly, students who move from Austin, Texas to St. Louis, Missouri to attend graduate 
school consent to move from a less risky to a more risky urban environment. In terms of crime 
rates St. Louis ranked fourth highest in 2008, where Austin ranked 187th.  CITY CRIME 
RANKINGS 2008-2009: CRIME ACROSS METROPOLITAN AMERICA (Kathleen O’Leary Morgan et 
al. eds., 2008). 
 56. Cherry & Engelhardt, supra note 50, at 241-42. 
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interests.57  This is the affirmation of a liberty interest (i.e., the endorsement 
of the value of individual freedom or autonomy) which constitutes another 
central element in the justification of the practice of informed consent. 
Persons convey authority to common projects by granting permission or 
giving consent. This includes both consent to and refusal of life-enhancing 
or life-saving medical care.  It also includes living organ donation, where 
persons consent to surgery from which they will receive absolutely no 
medical benefit, but which will presumably benefit others.  Here, I believe, 
Mr. Linford, citing Sally Satel and Benjamin Hippen, somewhat 
mischaracterizes the issue: 
[l]ikewise, the choice of some advocates of incentive programs to couch 
their arguments in terms of autonomy instead of market forces or efficiency 
appears to be a conscious choice to shape the debate in a fashion that 
makes their position more acceptable to those who might mistrust markets, 
but embrace concepts of human dignity and liberty.58 
While it is true that Satel and Hippen wish to recast the debate in what they 
perceive as more favorable terms, they are also pointing to a hidden 
contradiction at the core of public policy forbidding the sale of human 
organs for transplantation.  On the one hand, persons are usually 
conceived of as in authority over themselves and as the best judges of their 
own best interests.  On the other hand, prohibition of financial incentives for 
organ donation coercively denies such individual authority.59  Current organ 
transplantation law both affirms the authority of persons over themselves, 
thereby justifying organ procurement from living donors, and denies such 
authority, thereby prohibiting living donors from accepting financial 
incentives.  To emphasize, the goal of informed consent to medical 
treatment is not simply to endorse patient autonomy as a positive value; 
rather, it respects patient autonomy as a side constraint60—an 
 
 57. Id. at 239. 
 58. Linford, supra note 1, at 288. 
 59. See Thomas J. Bole, III, The Sale of Organs and Obligations to One’s Body: 
Inferences from the History of Ethics, in PERSONS AND THEIR BODIES: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, 
RELATIONSHIPS 331, 350 (Mark J. Cherry ed., 1999) (noting that the federal government does 
not possess the legitimate authority to constrain persons from selling their kidneys or to 
prohibit the purchase of kidneys for transplantation). 
 60. “Side constraints express the inviolability of others, in the ways they specify.  These 
modes of inviolability are expressed by the following injunction: ‘Don’t use people in specified 
ways.’  An end-state view, on the other hand, would express the view that people are ends and 
not merely means (if it chooses to express this view at all), by a different injunction: ‘Minimize 
the use in specified ways of persons as means.’  Following this precept itself may involve using 
someone as a means in one of the ways specified.  Had Kant held this view, he would have 
given the second formula of the categorical imperative as, ‘So act as to minimize the use of 
humanity simply as a means,’ rather than the one he actually used: ‘Act in such a way that you 
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acknowledgement that the burden of proof on others, including 
governments, bioethicists, and bureaucratic policy makers, to interfere in the 
free choices of persons with regard to their bodies, is significant indeed. 
Forbidding the sale of human organs for transplantation forbids 
competent adults from engaging in a commercial transaction from which 
both parties expect to benefit.  Morally permissible legislation does not 
extend to the coercive imposition of paternalistic regulations on free citizens 
as if they were mere children.  One may not approve of the choices of 
persons, but they are in authority to make such decisions regarding their 
own lives.  The moral authority that persons possess over themselves and 
their bodies is not the creation of the state; the state is no more than an 
organization of persons trusted with specific powers, including the protection 
of free persons from assault and battery.61  It is inaccurate to say that the 
state permits or tolerates certain unpalatable choices of persons; rather, the 
state does not usually have the legitimate moral authority to interfere in the 
free choices of persons regarding the use of their own bodies and minds.  
The burden of proof is on the state to show that it acts within its limited 
moral authority when it interferes with the free choices of persons regarding 
the use of their bodies, and that it so acts for significantly strong reasons to 
satisfy that burden. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Financial and other market incentives encourage persons to raise 
resources to further personal as well as social interests and goals.  Here, 
suggestive data need not be limited to attitudinal studies, with their potential 
for limited sampling and biased questioning.  There are plentiful economic 
data regarding the role of financial and other valuable incentives in 
motivating human behavior in a wide range of activities: from student grade 
 
always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply 
as a means, but always at the same time as an end.’”  ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND 
UTOPIA 32 (1974). 
 61. “Whatever their differences, at the core all theories of natural rights reject the idea 
that private property and personal liberty are solely creations of the state, which itself is only 
other people given extraordinary powers.  Quite the opposite, a natural rights theory asserts 
that the end of the state is to protect liberty and property, as these conceptions are understood 
independent of and prior to the formation of the state.  No rights are justified in a normative 
way simply because the state chooses to protect them, as a matter of grace.  To use a 
common example of personal liberty: the state should prohibit murder because it is wrong; 
murder is not wrong because the state prohibits it.  The same applies to property: trespass is 
not wrong because the state prohibits it; it is wrong because individuals own private property.” 
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 5-6 
(1985).  The role of the state is to enforce “the rights and obligations generated by theories of 
private entitlement.”  Id. 
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improvement, choice of career, and pollution reduction, to pharmaceutical 
development and choice of research interests.62  The competitive stimulus to 
gain personal, financial, and professional rewards frequently drives 
technological and medical innovation; it possesses a significant motivational 
force that is independent of a disinterested concern for civic mindedness, 
social solidarity, or generalized altruism.63  It is highly plausible that such 
incentives would be similarly successful in motivating the availability of 
human organs for transplantation. 
With the creation of a market in human organs, organ availability need 
not be limited to acts of altruism or depend on state coercion.  Profits from 
organ sales would allow the private pursuit of business and educational 
opportunities or more public agendas.  Given that social and personal 
advantage is often tied to educational and business success, such incentives 
may be significant.  However, even short-term welfare maximization, such as 
the purchase of housing or health care, may provide some with sufficient 
incentives to sell a redundant kidney.  Adequate commercialization would 
create opportunities, which some may view as attractive, to secure resources 
for pursuing their own educational, business, political, and welfare interests. 
Financial incentives would allow families to sell the organs of a 
deceased loved one, rather than simply to donate the organs.  Knowing that 
their families would benefit financially might persuade many more people to 
state their intention to be organ donors.  Potential donors might be willing to 
consider a futures contract in which they agree to sell any usable organ 
upon their death to a particular buyer and have the money paid as a death 
benefit to their descendents.  Others might be willing to sell a redundant 
internal organ such as a kidney while still living.  Indeed, some might see it 
as heroic—saving the life of another at some risk to oneself.  In general, 
public policy that expands the number of living donors would multiply the 
availability of transplantable organs, such as kidneys, bone marrow, and 
liver lobes.  If public policy also encouraged families to make available 
organs from recently deceased relatives, this would also increase availability 
 
 62. See DAVID FRIEDMAN, HIDDEN ORDER: THE ECONOMICS OF EVERYDAY LIFE (1996). 
 63. See, e.g., Mark J. Cherry, Scientific Excellence, Professional Virtue, and the Profit 
Motive: The Market and Health Care Reform, 28 J. MED. & PHIL. 259, 268 (2003) (noting that 
“the market creates social and political space to allow additional opportunities and incentives 
for health care procurement and allocation”); see generally Richard A. Epstein, Why America 
Does Not Have a Second Drug Problem, in INNOVATION AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: 
CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE VIRTUES OF PROFIT (H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. & Jeremy R. Garrett 
eds., 2008) (arguing that capitalism provides significant financial incentives to drive quality 
pharmaceutical innovation).  See generally, R. Garrett, Pharmaceutical Innovation and the 
Market: The Pursuit of Profit and the Amelioration of the Human Condition in INNOVATION AND 
THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE VIRTUES OF PROFIT (H. Tristram 
Engelhardt, Jr. & Jeremy R. Garrett eds., 2008). 
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of non-redundant organs, such as hearts from brain-dead and cadaver 
donors.  Expanding the pool of living and deceased donors would then save 
lives and reduce suffering. 
Financial incentives would not preclude the liberties of the altruistically 
inclined to realize their need charitably to take care of others.  Social and 
political institutions that support the free choices of persons to interact with 
free and consenting others are formally neutral with regard to the expression 
of charity.  Or, to rephrase the conceptual point: market-liberties include, 
but are not limited to, profit-seeking interests.  Unless legally prohibited, 
even with a free-market system, private individuals could still donate organs 
out of charity to family members or to others in need. 
Mr. Linford’s conclusion that the current altruism-based system of organ 
donation is not working adequately, whereas the use of incentives, such as 
college scholarships, would likely increase access to kidneys for 
transplantation, saving lives and reducing human suffering,64 is correct.  But, 
given the innovative possibilities of the market, I see no legitimate reason 
why public policy should starkly limit the valuable opportunities for 
encouraging organ donation to college scholarships—although, I suppose, 
one could see college scholarships as a small step in the right direction.  
Embracing the language and practice of commodification as a positive 
good and denying the illicit intuition that commodification of body parts is 
immoral, would benefit donors and recipients alike while also encouraging 
honesty in transplantation practice and public policy.  Utilizing market-based 
incentives, including, but not limited to, barter exchanges (e.g., college 
scholarships and organ swaps), would shed light on what is often a hazy 
and shrouded policy setting.  At stake is not solely the efficiency and 
effectiveness of human organ procurement for transplantation, but also the 
recognition of the moral authority of persons over themselves—both mind 
and body. 
 
 64. Linford, supra note 1, at 325-26. 
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